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Abstract
Previous empirical literature suggests that estimated wage cyclicality depends on
the structure of the relationship between real wages and an observed indicator of the
business cycle that econometric models impose prior to estimation. This paper, al-
leviates the problem of imposing such structure by searching directly for the largest
common cycles in longitudinal microdata using a Bayesian dynamic latent factor model.
We nd that the comovement of real wages is related to a common factor that exhibits
a signicant but imperfect correlation with the national unemployment rate. Among
others, our ndings indicate that the common factor explains, on average, no more
than 9% of wage variation, the common factor accounts for 20% or less of the wage
variability for 88% of the workers in the sample and roughly half of the wages move
procyclically while half move countercyclically. These facts are inconsistent with claims
of a strong systematic relationship between real wages and business cycles.
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1 Introduction
The cyclicality of real wages is a crucial element that allows us to di¤erentiate between
competing theories of the labor market. Previous econometric studies impose structure on
the relationship between real wages and an observed indicator of the business cycle (the
unemployment rate) prior to estimation. In fact, the ndings from the literature suggest
that the estimated wage cyclicality depends on this structure: real wages are estimated to
be mildly to strongly procyclical when wages are assumed to depend only on the current
unemployment rate [e.g. Bils (1985), Keane et al. (1988), Shin (1994), Solon et al. (1994),
Shin and Solon (2006) and, more recently, Verdugo (2016)] whereas they are estimated to
be acyclical when the real wage of each individual, in addition to the current unemployment
rate (common across all wages), is assumed to also depend on appropriate lagged values of
the unemployment rate [e.g. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991)]. 1 In this paper, we estimate
wage comovement, which then allows us to draw conclusions about real wage cyclicality,
avoiding the problem of imposing any a priori structure on the relationship between real
wages and observed indicators of the business cycle. In particular, we provide new evidence
using longitudinal microdata in conjunction with a relatively recent econometric approach,
that of a dynamic factor model.2 The dynamic factor model searches directly for the largest
common cycle in wage data, alleviating the problem of dening the cycle as any particular
macroeconomic variable. The use of individual micro data allows us to determine whether
the cyclicality of wages is specic to a certain subset of individuals, which alleviates the
1In the 6th specication of Beaudry and DiNardo (see Table 2 of their paper), in addition to the common
(across all wages) current unemployment rate, there are two extra terms a¤ecting real wages: (i) the best
market condition (minimum unemployment rate) since the worker was hired and (ii) the market condition
(unemployment rate) at the start of the job. When the last two terms are excluded, the coe¢cient on
the current unemployment rate is estimated to be large and signicant, whereas when those two terms
are incorporated, the coe¢cient on the current unemployment rate is estimated to be, roughly, zero and
statistically insignicant.
2Cunha and Heckman (2008) also use a dynamic factor model along with longitudinal microdata to study
cognitive and non-cognitive skill formation in early childhood.
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problem of composition bias.3 Our main objective is to investigate whether real wages
comove substantially over the business cycle, and to disentangle the cyclical properties of
wages for skilled (college) and unskilled (no college) workers. To do so, we employ a dynamic
latent factor model in which real wages respond to common as well as skill-specic factors.
Our dynamic factor model is motivated by the fact that if real wages exhibit a systematic
relationship with the business cycle, then there should be a common factor accounting for
a considerable amount of their variability. Furthermore, from a macroeconomic perspective,
wage cyclicality would imply that the common factor drives the majority of real wages in
the same direction. We provide evidence that real wages do not comove substantially and
do not exhibit strong comovement related to the aggregate business cycle. The common
factor present in wage data that we estimate does in fact turn out to be correlated with the
national unemployment rate. However, we show that no more than 9% of wage variability
is attributed to the common factor. We also show that real wages do not exhibit a distinct
pattern as regards to their response to the common factor. Finally, we conrm ndings of
previous studies in which the wages of skilled and unskilled workers exhibit roughly the same
degree of cyclical variation.
The cyclical behavior of real wages enables us to draw inferences about di¤erent theories
of the labor market as described analytically in appendix A. In macro models, business cycles
are driven by aggregate shocks and endogenous variables can be expressed as functions of the
state of the world so that their solution is expressed in the form of an approximate dynamic
factor model. A set of competing theories (models) impose a structure on the relationship
between real wages and the business cycle which depends on the evolution of state variables.
For instance, in Walrasian models real wages coincide with marginal productivity. Since
marginal productivity (usually driven by an aggregate shock) is highly correlated with the
business cycle, real wages appear to be strongly procyclical. On the other hand, a labor
3The construction of mean real wages is such that it gives more weight to low-skill workers during
expansions than during recessions. It is argued that the latter is causing signicant countercyclical bias to
real wages.
3
contracting model implies that real wages depend not only on marginal productivity, but
also on an insurance component that results from bargaining between worker and rm. These
two components o¤set each other in such a way that real wages become acyclical.4 Moreover,
in models of this class, equilibrium real wages also depend on market conditions the time
labor contracts are signed. In this case, real wages depend not only on the current state of the
economy but also on previous states of the economy. In the appendix of the paper, we briey
describe the relevant feature of neoclassical and labor contracting models which determines
how wages behave and demonstrate that the models have di¤erent implications for both the
relationship between individual wages and the common factor, as well as the quantitative
importance of the factor itself. The dynamic factor analysis in this paper can then be a
direct test of the neoclassical model or, more generally, any model which imposes structure
on the relationship between real wages and the business cycle.5 It has two advantages over
a direct estimation of structural models. First, we can consider a large panel of workers of
di¤erent types to see if the neoclassical implications hold for most indviduals, or for at least
a subset of workers. Second, our test of the model will not lead to a rejection simply because
some other feature of the structural model (such as the consumption Euler equation) rejects
the RBC model.
Our ndings suggest that real wages behave in a manner more consistent with models of
labor contracting, though other models may be as well. This is in the line of the ndings
presented by Cooley and Ogaki (1996) who show that the time series properties of real wages
are compatible with Walrasian models only in the long-run, whereas in the short-run they
are better explained by an optimal labor contract model.6 Finally, our evidence conrms
4The theoretical backround of implicit contracts lies in the work of Bailey (1974), Azariadis (1975, 1976)
and Gordon (1974). Other theories developed to address real wage acyclicality include e¢ciency wage and
insider-outsider models.
5While the labor contracting model is consistent with the empirical results, this is not a test of that model
as other models might be consistent as well.
6Similar results to Cooley and Ogaki are reported by Osano and Inoue (1991), Beaudry and DiNardo
(1991,1995) and Ham and Reilly (2002) who contrast and test Walrasian and labor contacting models. While
the Walrasian models perform poorly in testing, the contracting models cannot be rejected by the data.
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the ndings of Keane and Prasad (1993) in that the behavior of real wages of skilled and
unskilled workers do not exhibit substantial di¤erences over the business cycle. We reach
this conclusion from the fact that the skill-specic factors we estimate are not quantitatively
important.
Our results are distinct from the existing literature in the use of the individual level
data coupled with the dynamic factor model. At the same time our work is part of a long
history of studying the cyclical behavior of wages and it is useful to briey review the main
contributions. Given that the literature is too large and varied, our review will not be
exhaustive. Several studies estimate econometric models using disaggregated data to control
for composition and aggregation e¤ects. In most of those studies, real wages are regressed
on the current unemployment rate, as an indicator of the business cycle, and other worker-
specic characteristics. Among others, these studies, include the work of Bils (1985), Keane,
Mo¢tt and Runkle (1988), Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994), Shin (1994), Ziliak, Wilson
and Stone (1999), Shin and Solon (2006) and Verdugo (2016). Bils, Solon et al., Shin, Ziliak
et al., Shin and Solon, and Verdugo, nd that real wage acyclicality is simply a statistical
illusion and that real wages are strongly procyclical. Using US data, Solon et al. nd
that the composition bias issue is quantitatively important. A similar result is reported by
Verdugo who nds that real wages in the Eurozone are highly procyclical, while composition
e¤ects have been particularly large since 2008. Bils however, demonstrates that the impact
of composition bias is not notably large and argues that wage procyclicality is due to the
inclusion of overtime earnings.7 Keane et al report that real wages are only mildly procyclical
after controling for sample selection bias.8 Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) on the other hand,
7The signicance of overtime earnings in generating procyclical real wages is also reported by Devereux
(2001), using data from the US, and Anger (2011), using data from Germany. The wage measure used in
our analysis includes tips, overtime and bonuses.
8Using similar methodology -i.e. regressing current (or rst-di¤erenced) real wages to the current (or
rst-di¤erenced) unemployment rate-, Deveraux and Hart (2006), nd that job movers exhibit higher real
wage procyclicality than job stayers using UK data. Similar results are reported by Carneiro et al. (2012)
and Martins et al. (2012), using Portuguese data and Haefke, Sonntag and Thijs van Rens (2013), using
US data. Peng and Siebert (2008) also nd that job stayers in Northern Italy have procyclical real wages,
especially in the private sector and in smaller rms.
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demonstrate that when appropriate lagged values of the cyclical indicator are included in
the regression then the estimated procyclicality of real wages dissapears.
Previous studies have found that the real wages of skilled workers exhibit di¤erent low fre-
quency variation than that of the real wages of unskilled workers. Katz and Murphy (1992),
nd that this behavior can be explained by di¤erent demand shifts for skilled and unskilled
labor. Motivated by those ndings, Acemoglu (1998), develops a theoretical framework to
show that the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers as well as the changes in the
demand for skills are due to skilled-biased technological change which is determined endoge-
nously. Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000), report empirical evidence showing
that wage di¤erentials are due to the existence of capital-skill complementarity which is
present in the production process. These theoretical and empirical arguments have direct
implications in building alternative theories of the labor market. These theories must also
be consistent with the cyclical behavior of wage di¤erentials and thus, knowledge of cyclical
facts of skilled versus unskilled wages is essential. Within the context of our framework,
if the cyclical properties of real wages for skilled and unskilled workers are not alike, then
there should exist di¤erent skill-specic factors explaining a considerable portion of wage
variability. We nd that there is little evidence of signicantly distinct cycles for these two
groups of workers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a description of
our dataset which is extracted from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS). Section 3,
introduces the model and section 4 lays out our econometric framework and methodology.
Section 5 presents our results and section 6 concludes.
2 The Data
Our data on hourly wages are taken from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLSY79 Co-
hort), which is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 men and women born in the years
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1957 through 1964. All respondents were interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994. We use
the time series from 1979 to 1993 and collect information from the survey on employment,
wages and sociodemographic characteristics.9
The advantage of the NLS panel data set is that it avoids problems related to having a
changing work force and enables us to control for various worker characteristics. Unlike the
Michigans Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), where the hourly wage in a given year
is the ratio of the annual income to the annual hours of work, in the NLS the respondents
directly report their hourly rate of pay in the week of the interview. Thus, the advantage
of using NLS over PSID is that hourly wages are less contaminated by recall bias.10 11 We
accept only those respondents that meet the following restrictions: 1) Must be at least 18
years old at the interview date; 2) Are not self-employed; 3) There must be at least 7 years
of available time series observations; 4) Are not enrolled in school the last 2 years of the
sample period.
After removing the respondents who do not meet our criteria our sample contains 2,123
individuals and 31,845 person-year observations. We provide further analysis of our sample
by classifying individuals into 8 broadly dened categories on the basis of skills, gender and
race. We dene skilled workers as those having at least a college degree and unskilled workers
as the remainder of the sample. Race is dened based on the information provided by NLS,
which classies the respondents into three race groups, Hispanic, black and non-black/non-
Hispanic. We group the sample into two main categories. One category consists of blacks and
9The text of question for the years 1979 to 1993 asks the respondents to report amount earned that includes
tips, overtime and bonuses before deductions. The hourly rate of pay in survey year 1994 is calculated a
little di¤erently. Respondents are rst asked if they are paid hourly; if so, then that reported hourly wage is
used in the created hourly rate. Presumably, this hourly wage does not inlcude tips, overtime and bonuses.
Otherwise, if the respondents report other than an hourly wage, then they are asked for earnings that include
tips, overtime, and bonuses (just as in the years 1979-1993) from which hourly rate of pay is created. Given
that there is a di¤erence in methodology for 1994 we exclude this year from our sample.
10The reported hourly wage refers to the respondents current or most recent job at the time of the
interview. In the NLS survey the current or most recent job is refered to as job #1 which, after 1982, is
nearly always the CPS job.
11We do not use more recent data of the survey for two reasons. First, the number of respondents is
decreasing (relative to the initial sample in 1979) which reduces further the number of eligible individuals in
our sample. Second, after 1994, individuals are interviewed every two years rather than annually.
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Hispanic and the other one consists of the remainder of the sample, which is assumed to be
largely non-minority. A detailed description of the composition of our sample can be found
in Table 1. The wage measure is deated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to provide a
real wage measure normalized in terms of 1983 CPI dollars. The data are log-rst-di¤erenced
and demeaned before estimation.12
One potential issue that we face is that our dataset is an unbalanced panel as missing
observations constitute 27.7% of the sample. Missing observations arise in the NLS because
either the respondent is not interviewed or he/she is enrolled at school or he/she is unem-
ployed. Wage observations where respondents are enrolled at school but at the same time
report a positive wage rate are treated as missing observations. (Information about missing
observations for each category can be found in Table 1.) One approach to solving this prob-
lem is to simply drop the time series containing missing observations. Since this signifcantly
reduces the sample size, and may induce a selection bias, we take an alternative approach.
We treat the missing oberservations as random variables and estimate them as part of our
econometric model. Our methodology for estimating the missing observations is described
in section 4 and Appendix B.
3 The Dynamic Factor Model
To estimate the cyclical properties of real wages we use a dynamic factor model in the spirit
of Sargent and Sims (1977) as implemented by Kose et al. (2003). This statistical model
di¤ers from the models traditionally employed to estimate wage cyclicality. In previous work,
wages are associated with cyclical indicators (eg. the unemployment rate). Of course, if one
chooses the wrong cyclical indicator the results will be biased towards nding acyclical
wages. The factor model, by denition, extracts the largest common cycle(s) in the wage
12This treatment of the data is the same form as the log deviations from steady-state that would come
from a DSGE model.
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data. Hence, we are nding the maximum possible amount of cyclicality in the wage data.
Our model then gives the best possible chance to the theories in favor of cyclical wages.
To be concrete, let yt be a vector of real wages for N individuals at time t. Then, yt can
be explained by a vector ft of K common factors and a vector "t of N individual-specic
noise terms. We assume that ft and "t evolve according to the following autoregressions:
ft = 
f (L) ft 1 + u
f
t (3.1)
and
"t =  (L) "t 1 + ut (3.2)
where f (L) and  (L) are diagonal K x Q and N x P matrices of polynomials in the lag
operator, respectively. The vectors of disturbances uft and ut are assumed to be zero mean
and normally distributed with
E

u
f
t u
f 0


=
8><
>:
Mf for t = 
0 otherwise
and E (utu
0
 ) =
8><
>:
M for t = 
0 otherwise
whereMf andM are diagonal matrices and E

u
f
t ut

= 0. In other words, the factors are
independent from each other and the individual-specic noise terms are independent across
individuals. The statistical model for yt is
yt = bf t + "t (3.3)
where b is a N x K matrix of factor loadings.
We focus our attention in characterizing the dynamic e¤ects of three factors. The common
dynamics of real wages across all individuals are captured by the common factor f c. The
factors f s (where s= skilled or unskilled) drive the wages of a subset of individuals with the
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same skill level. Thus, having panel data on N individuals, each observed for T time periods,
our model for the real wage of individual i is
yi;t = bc;if
c
t + bs;if
s
t + "i;t
for i = 1; 2; ::; N ; s=skilled or unskilled; t = 1; ::; T
(3.4)
where bj;i is the factor loading that captures the sensitivity of the wage of worker i to factor
j. Note that for a skilled worker the factor loading on the unskilled factor is constrained
to zero, and vice versa for the unskilled worker. The corresponding idiosyncratic error "i;t
follows a pi-order autoregression:
"i;t = i;1"i;t 1 + i;2"i;t 2 + :::+ i;pi"i;t pi + ui;t (3.5)
where i;j represents the exposure of the idiosyncratic error to its jth lag and ui;t iidN(0; 
2
i ).
Likewise, the law of motion of factor j is given by the AR (qi) process:
f jt = fk;1f
j
t 1 + fk;2f
j
t 2 + :::+ fk;qif
j
t qi + u
f
k;t
for k = c, s
(3.6)
where fk;j represents the exposure of factor k to its jth lag and u
f
k;t iidN(0; 
2
f;k).
4 Estimation
We estimate the factors and the parameters of the econometric model 3:4   3:6 using the
Bayesian approach developed in Otrok and Whiteman (1998). We simulate from the joint
posterior of the parameters and factors using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo alogorithm. The
main part of their procedure is a Gibbs sampler that sequentially draws the parameters
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conditional on the factors, and then the factors conditional on the parameters.13
Since the innovations to idiosyncratic terms are uncorrelated, conditional on the factors,
the system 4:4 consists of N independent regression models. Hence, conditional on the
factors, we use Chib and Greenbergs (1994) procedure to draw the regression parameters
separately for each equation. Since the model has 2,123 equations this feature of their
procedure makes the estimation feasible for our dataset. A full derivation and description of
the relevant conditional densities can be found in Otrok and Whiteman (1998).
The (conjugate) prior densities for bi, i, fk and 
2
i are chosen to be the same as
those used in Otrok and Whiteman (1998). Specically, the prior for the factor loadings
bi is Gausian with zero mean and precision (1/variance) equal to 0:01. The persistence
parameters of the innovation and factor processes i and fk are also Gaussian with zero
mean and precision equal to 0:85 for all lags. The prior of the idiosyncratic innovation
variance 2i is an inverted gamma  (=2; =2) with  = 6 and  = 0:001. These priors are
fairly di¤use and the main results are not very sensitive to values of prior parameters around
the ones chosen.
Our dataset poses a technical problem due to missing observations for wages in some
years for many of the survey respondents. Instead of ommiting the time series we assume
that the missing observations are random variables and we estimate these missing observa-
tions as part of our econometric model. We do so by rst deriving the distribution of the
missing data points conditional on the parameters and factors. This distribution depends on
both cross-sectional information as well as the time series data before and after the missing
observation. Intuitively, the distribution depends on both a forecast and backcast of the
missing observation using the univariate time series data itself, and the parameters govern-
ing the dynamics of the time series. It also includes cross-sectional information: the factor
loading is used along with the factor itself to predict the missing value. Our procedure
13The scales of the factor loadings are separately identied from those of the factors by normalizing the
variances of the factors to a constant, as is common in the literature
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combines both types of information. A direct way to do this is by applying the Kalman
lter and then smoothing the means and the variances by backward induction. Details of
the procedure are in Appendix B.14
Our Gibbs sampler then has three blocks. In block one we condition on factors and model
parameters to draw the missing observations (for those time series with missing data). Then,
in block two we treat the missing data drawn in block one as data and draw the model
parameters. Finally, conditional on the drawn missing data and parameters we draw the
factors. The procedure is repeated 5000 times after an initial burnin of 500 draws.
5 Empirical Results
Our primary interest is to provide answers to two questions: First, do real wages exhibit a
systematic relationship with the business cycle? Second, are the wages of skilled and unskilled
workers subject to a signicantly di¤erent degree of cyclical variation? To answer the rst
question we focus on the importance of the common factor in equation 3.4. To answer the
second question we focus on the relative contribution of the skill factors in equation 3.4
in accounting for real wage uctuations. Since the factors (common and skill specic) are
estimated simultaneously, the skill factors are capturing how much comovement there is for a
specic skill group conditional on comovement already accounted for by the factor common
to all wages. That is, skilled (or unskilled) wages may comove simply because all wages
comove. Our model determines instead how much comovement there is in skilled wages that
is not common to wages of all skill levels. This conditioning is important, as it alleviates the
danger of looking only at, say, the wages of skilled workers, and mistakenly concluding that
skilled wages have a common cycle, when that cycle is in fact common to a wider array of
14Note that only the second type of selection bias, discussed by Keane et al (1988), could be somewhat
relevant to the estimation of the factor model. As described in the text, the latter is addressed by replacing
the missing wages by values (implied wages), which are estimated using information both before and after
the occurrence of the missing wages as well as cross-sectional information based on the factors and factor
loadings.
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individuals.
5.1 The Dynamic Factors
Figure 1 presents the mean of the posterior distribution of the factors along with corre-
sponding 95 percent posterior coverage intervals. The bounds of the condence intervals
are tight which shows that the factors are estimated quite precisely. The common factor is
characterized by the troughs of 1983 and 1990 and the peak of 1987. The troughs occur at
roughly the same time that NBER recessions occur. In particular, the trough of the 1983
lags the NBER recession of the 1982 whereas the trough of 1990 leads the NBER recession
of 1991.15
The variable used by the previous studies as an indicator of the business cycle is the
national unemployment rate. In fact, our common (wage) factor exhibits a strong negative
correlation (-0.69) with the national unemployment rate (in levels) which indicates that
the unemployment indicator captures a good portion of real wage cyclicality. However,
the correlation is not perfect so assuming that unemployment is the common wage cycle
underestimates the degree of wage cyclicality to a modest extent. It is the case that our
estimates suggest that macroeconomic conditions are relevant, at least to some extent, for
the cyclical behavior of real wages.
We interpret the factor as being related to the macroeconomic business cycle. In Figure
2 we plot the wage factor along with TFP, and also the wage factor with a macro factor,
The macro factor is estimated using unemployment, TFP, real GDP growth, growth of the
price of real investment, and the growth of labor productivity. As is evident from the gure,
there is a correspondence of the wage factor with the macro factor. At the same time, the
wage factor does not move very closely with TFP. The wage factor then is related to a broad
cross section of macroeconomic variables. While TFP does have a relationship with the
15The sign of the factor is normalized so that it moves in the same direction as an factor extracted from
macroeconomic data. This normalization implies that wages fall in a recession.
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wage factor, it is clearly not very strong. This is precisely why we do not want to study the
cyclicality of wages using either TFP or a single macroeconomic variable.16
The skill-specic factors appear less cyclical than the aggregate factor and have distinct
dynamics from each other. The correlation coe¢cient between the skilled and the unskilled
factors is 0.26 which signies that real wages embody a distinct component which is specic
to skills.17 The correlation coe¢cient between the skill factors and the unemployment rate
is almost zero. Both factors exhibit substantial variation until 1985 and relatively smooth
uctuations afterwards.18
To examine whether common uctuations are more persistent than skill specic uctu-
ations we report the rst-order autocorrelation coe¢cients of the factors. Our estimates
indicate that aggregate common uctuations are highly persistent just like the unemploy-
ment rate. The common uctuations of unskilled wages are also highly persistent with an
autocorrelation coe¢cient of 0.68. Contrary to the common and the unskilled factors, the
skilled factor exhibits a negative autocorrelation of -0.21 which suggests that it is weakly
mean reverting. The di¤ering dynamics of the skilled factor suggests that there are forces
unique to skilled workers driving their wages. If we interpret this in light of the theoretical
models presented in the appendix, then this would suggest skill-specic productivity shocks.
We do not push this interpretation very hard though, since we will see that these factors
are not quantitatively important. Next we examine the direction to which a change in each
of the factors a¤ects real wages. Figure 3 displays the cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) of the factor loadings. The CDFs illustrate that roughly half of real wages in our
sample respond positively to the factors while the other half respond negatively. Thus, there
is no distinct pattern of the responses of real wages to the common factors.
16The correlation coe¢cients between the wage factor and the macro factor, TFP, the real price of invest-
ment, labor productivity and real GDP growth are 0.54, 0.17, -0.28, -0.24 and 0.06, respectively.
17The assumption in the econometric model is that the innovations between the two skill factors is zero.
However, this assumption is not imposed in the estimation so the skill factor can be correlated if the data
so indicate. We do impose that that aggregate factor is orthogonal to the two skill factors.
18Lacombe and Conley (1985) explain the spike in wages shown in 1984.
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Macroeconomic models of the labor market can be classied based on the mechanism
according to which real wages are being determined and the implied cyclicality of the latter.
Surveying all relevant models is not the objective of this paper. However, in the appen-
dix we show that the factor model can be employed as a test of one model of the labor
marketthe Walrasian spot market model of wages. Testing via the factor model enable
us to consider a large panel of longitudinal micro data on real wages to check whether the
neoclassical implications hold for most individuals or a subset of them. The factor model
also eliminates the possibility of rejecting the theory simply because some irrelevant feature
of the theoretical model is problematic. As shown in the appendix, a neoclassical model of
the labor market where marginal productivities depend on aggregate shocks (commonly, an
aggregate technology shock) would imply that all wages respond with the same sign to the
common factor. For instance, an improvement in technology would increase the wages of all
workers. Therefore, in such model, we expect that real wages would exhibit a positive and
strong correlation with the business cycle. Our results are strongly at odds with the spot
market/Walrasian assumption at the heart of RBC models.
On the other hand, a wage contracting model with some heterogeneity in preferences
(e.g. in risk aversion) may exhibit responses with di¤erent signs for a single change in market
conditions (which may reect improvement or deterioration of the level of technology). The
latter is consistent with factor loading coe¢cients that di¤er in sign and magnitude. Our
results indicate that the common factor exhibits responses with di¤erent signs which suggests
that the data are inconsistent with the predictions of a Walrasian model but consistent with
predictions of a labor contracting model. There may of course be many models consistent
with these results, our main point is that the RBC model is not, and we can identify at least
one reasonable alternative.
15
5.2 Variance Decompositions
To examine the quantitative signicance of the cyclical factors we estimate the contribution of
each of them to the overall variability of observables. Since the factors and the idiosyncratic
component are orthogonal to each other it is straightforward to partition the variance of each
observable into the fraction that is due to each of the underlying factors and the idiosyncratic
component by applying the Var operator to equation 3.4. Reporting the full posterior
distributions of all 2,123 posteriors is infeasible, so instead we report information on the
distribution of the posterior means of the 2,123 variance decompositions. In most cases that
we examined the posterior coverage intervals were tighly distributed about the mean. Figure
4 displays frequencies of variance decompositions across the skilled, the unskilled and the
whole sample while Figure 5 displays CDFs of the corresponding variance decompositions.
Table 2 presents analytically the number of individuals falling in each interval of variance
shares attributable to each of the factors and the idiosyncratic component.
The common factor explains, on average, no more than 9% of the variance of real wages.
We obtain similar results when we examine the impact of the factor separately on skilled and
unskilled wages. Overall, the common factor accounts for 20% or less of the wage variability
for 88% of the workers in the sample. The share of variance attributable to the common
factor exceeds 50% for only 1% of the workers. In other words, the wages of only 1% of
the respondents are overwhelmingly inuenced by current economic conditions, as reected
through the common factor. These results show that the factor plays a relatively minor role in
accounting for wage movements over the business cycle. Consequently, the explanatory power
of the common factor is inadequate to justify claims for strong procyclical or countercyclical
movements of real wages. Likewise, the skill factor explains, on average, no more than 10%
of wage variability and accounts for 20% or less of wage variability for 84% of the workers
in the sample. Those ndings reinforce the evidence of previous studies which show that
skilled and unskilled wages face essentially the same degree of cyclical variation.
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These results are also inconsistent with a xed nominal wage contract model. If we
augment the neoclassical model in appendix A.I. with a model where nominal wages are
set for a xed number of periods, then we would nd that at least half, or a quarter of the
wages, depending on the nominal wage contract length, would depend almost completely on
the common factor. For example, if we have nominal wages xed for 1 period, and half of
workers get to change wages in a given period, then our common factor would nd that more
than half of the workers respond to the common factor.19
Notably, the idiosyncratic component is an important factor of wage uctuations. It can
explain more than 70% of wage variability for 78% of the workers. It is possible that this
residual may include the e¤ects of characteristics such as gender and race. To examine the
robustness of our main results we extend our model by including gender and race factors.
Specically, we assume that there is a specic factor driving the wages of male workers and a
separate factor driving the wages of female workers. As for the race characteristics we follow
the NLS classication and assume two broadly dened race factors, one driving the wages
of blacks and hispanics and another driving the wages of the remainder. We call the latter
group nonminority and the former group minority. For instance, in this setting, the real
wage of a skilled female worker who belongs to a minority group is driven by ve factors, one
that drives the wages of all workers, one that drives the wages of all skilled workers, one that
drives the wages of all female workers, one that drives the wages of all minority workers and
nally a factor that is specic to the worker. We nd that the gender and the race factors
have little to no explanatory power and do not change our main results. Thus, they are not
retained in the nal statistical model.
19If productivity were iid then exactly 50 percent of the individuals would be driven by the common factor,
but since there is serial correlation in productivity, wages in adjacent periods would be related to each other,
which would be picked up by the dynamics in the factor. This would lead to more than 50 percent of the
sample having a quantitatively important response to the common factor .
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6 Concluding Remarks
The cyclical behavior of real wages has long been a central issue in macroeconomics. Our
contribution to this literature is to use a dynamic factor model with longitudinal data to nd
the largest possible common cycle in real wages. The advantage of this approach over previ-
ous approaches is that it does not impose structure on the relationship between real wages
and observed indicators of the business cycle prior to estimation. Our approach also allows
us to use longitudinal micro data from the NLS to control for composition and aggregation
e¤ects. Our model allows us to analyze the degree and the nature of the comovement of real
wages across the entire population as well as separately for skilled and unskilled workers. It
also enables us to quantify the contribution of each factor in wage variability.
We nd that the common factor exhibits a signicant but not perfect correlation with
the national unemployment rate which is the common component of real wages assumed
by previous studies. This indicates that macroeconomic conditions have indeed an impact
on real wages. Nevertheless, variance decompositions show that, on average, the common
factor accounts for only a small fraction of wage uctuations. Furthermore, roughly half
the wages are procyclical and half are countercyclical. These results are not consistent with
neoclassical models of labor markets. Our ndings also suggest that although skilled and
unskilled wages are driven by di¤erent common skill factors, these factors cannot explain a
signicant portion of wage variability.
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Appendix A: The Factor Model and Two Theoretical
Models
I. A Neoclassical Model
The dynamic factor model of section 4 can be motivated by a standard real business
cycle model augmented with a model of measurement error induced by the agency gathering
data. This motivation follows directly from the work of Sargent (1989). We start with a
textbook real business cycle model, that of King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), which species
preferences, technology and budget constraints. Using standard parametric functional forms
for preferences and technology the model can be log-linearized and solved.20 As is well known
the solution of this model takes the form of a state law of motion and set of decision rules
for observable variables:
St+1 = St + Et+1 (A.1)
Yt = HSt (A.2)
The rst system of equations describes the dynamic evolution of the vector of state
variables and exogenous shocks, such as capital and technology. The second system of
equations are the decision rules, linking the vector of endogenous choices, Yt, to the current
state vector, St. Typical decision variables are labor e¤ort and consumption. Of course, the
real wage would appear in Yt as well.
As is well known, the real wage of the representative agent in this model is highly pro-
cyclical as the wage is equal to the marginal product of labor. To clarify this implication
we follow the conventional way to decentralize the Pareto optimal equilibria of the model
by assuming spot-competitive labor markets. Let the utility of agent i, U i, be dened over
consumption, Cit, and work e¤ort, Hit such that U
i
C > 0, U
i
CC < 0, U
i
H < 0 and U
i
HH < 0,
20Typically one assumes CRRA utility, Cobb-Douglass production, AR(1) technology shocks and a linear
capital accumulation equation
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where subscripts denote derivatives. Let t be an exogenous state variable which is the
driving force of business cycle uctuations. Without loss of generality, since in RBC models,
t commonly denotes the level of neutral technology, we will simply call t technology.
21 Let
 i (t) denote the agents marginal productivity which is an increasing function of technology
t. The intratemporal e¢ciency condition derived from an RBC model is
 U iH (Cit; Hit)
U iC (Cit; Hit)
=  i (t) (A.3)
This condition results from the agent equating his marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure to the real wage, while rms choose labor such that the marginal
product of labor equals the real wage. The spot-market equilibrium then implies that real
wages equal marginal productivities. Consequently, under spot-competitive labor markets
we expect that over the business cycle there is a common (macro) component, , driving the
real wages of all agents, and that these wages move in the same direction.
Our extension of this model assumes that we do not get to observe the true real wage.
Instead, we have many noisy observations on individual wages from this competitive spot
labor market. The noise is induced by a data-gathering agency which must survey individuals
to nd out their wages. These survey data are riddled with errors, both recall errors from
the agents and statistical errors from the agency itself. Our second system of equations then
becomes:
Yt = HSt +Ut (A.4)
where Ut represents the measurement error and the Yt vector contains the full set of indi-
vudals surveyed.
The empirical model we will use in this paper, a dynamic factor model, is motivated
directly from equations A.1 and A.4. These equations take the same general form as a
21For the sake of simplicity we omit shocks other than t from our notation; t can also be viewed as a
composition of di¤erent shocks.
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dynamic factor model. To make this link concrete consider the dynamic factor representation
for a vector of wage data yt:
yt = bf t + "t (A.5)
where b is a N x K matrix of factor loadings. The factor ft is assumed to follow an
autoregressive process:
ft = 
f (L) ft 1 + u
f
t (A.6)
It is clear from comparing equations A.1 and A.4 with equations A.5 and A.6 that the
dynamic factor model takes the same form as the linearized solution to the real business
cycle model with measurement error. Were one to simulate data from the RBC model and
estimate a factor model on the simulated data, the estimated dynamic factor would then be
the common state variable (e.g. technology shock) in the business cycle model. When we
turn to actual data, if the neoclassical labor market embodying this model is largely correct,
then when we estimate the factor model on wage data we should have two key results. First,
as long as the wage data are not dominated by measurement errors, the common factor
should be quantitatively important for explaining real wage dynamics. Second, the wages
should all respond with the same sign to this common factor since in the business cycle
model all wages respond positively to changes in productivity.
II. A Wage Contracting Model
Our second labor market model is based on an alternative way to decentralize the Pareto
optimal equilibria by considering a model where agents trade labor contracts. In such a
model, wages and employment are specied in a contract which is the outcome of dynamic
bargaining between workers and rms. The contract, fwi (t), H
i (t)g, consists of an hourly
wage rate and hours of work that are contingent on the future state of technology. The
contract is such that the e¢ciency condition A.3 holds, but the hourly wage rate is not
necessarily equal to  i (t). The hourly wage not only responds to changes in productivity but
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also provides insurance to risk averse agents against business cycle uctuations.22 Contrary
to the spot market case, under reasonable assumptions, in equilibrium the wage will not be
strongly correlated with productivity. This is due to the fact that the wage embodies an
insurance component which minimizes their uctuations. Furthermore, a given change in 
may induce the wages of some agents to increase while others to decrease. Hence, responses
of di¤erent signs to a given change in the common component are consistent with the theory
of implicit contracts. To illustrate these two points, we provide a simple example where
consumption equals labor earnings that is, Cit = w
i
tHit, and the agents di¤er in terms of
their aversion toward risk. Assuming separable CRRA preferences, condition A.3 can be
solved for the equilibrium wage (see Boldrin and Horvath (1995)):23
wit = i [ i (t)]
1
i

1 Hit
Hit

(A.7)
where i > 0 and i is the agents coe¢cient of risk aversion. (Note that the linearized version
of equation A.7 would enter the decision rules A.2 or A.4 in the state space system describing
the model dynamics.) In this case, the equilibrium wage is comprised of two components,
productivity and insurance (which is the ratio of leisure to labor). Productivity is strongly
procyclical whereas the insurance component is countercyclical because hours of work are
procyclical. The latter o¤sets the increases (decreases) in productivity and thus, wages do
not appear to respond strongly to technology shocks. Notice that parameter i controls the
elasticity of the hourly wage to the marginal product of labor uctuations. Depending on
the value of i, for some individuals the e¤ect of the insurance component may dominate
the e¤ect of productivity and thereby, the change in their wage, in response to an increase
in , will have a negative sign. The more risk averse an agent is the more likely she/he
22The idea is based on the assumption that capital markets are inadequate to fully bu¤er the agents
consumption against adverse shocks.
23The same condition for the equilibrium wage can be derived when preferences are nonseparable. In that
case however, parameter i is the within period elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure
(see Pourpourides (2011)).
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is to have a negative wage response to an increase in . To summarize, the contracting
model rst implies that real wages will not exhibit a strong commmon cycle, implying that
any common dynamic factor should have little explanatory power for real wage uctuations.
Second, if there is heterogeneity in preferences then the model predicts that the factor loading
coe¢cients in the dynamic factor model will have both positive and negative signs.24
Appendix B: Factor Models with Unbalanced Panels
In this appendix we describe the procedure for estimating the missing observations. This
procedure forms one block of our Gibbs sampler. In block one we draw the parameters
conditional on factors and missing data. In block two we draw the factors conditional on
parameters and missing data. In block three we draw the missing data conditional on
parameters and factors. In essence, we ll in the missing observations of the unbalanced
panel using information in both the model and available data. It is this last block that we
describe in this appendix. The rst two blocks are described in Otrok and Whiteman (1998).
Let i;t = i;1i;t 1 + ::: + i;pii;t pi + ui;t where i;t = yi;t   bc;if
c
t   bs;if
s
t . Then, the
following state space system is obtained:
yi;t = A
0
ixt +H
0 i;t +wi;t (B.1)
i;t+1 = Fii;t + vi;t+1 (B.2)
24To further motivate our empirical work, consider the simple example where consumption equals labor
earnings expressing equilibrium wages and work e¤ort as functions of relevant factors. Then, (A.3) is written
as
 U iH
 
wi
 
ft; f
i
t

Hi
 
ft; f
i
t

; Hi
 
ft; f
i
t

U iC
 
wi
 
ft; f
i
t

Hi
 
ft; f
i
t

; Hi
 
ft; f
i
t
 =  i (t)
where ft is a common factor across all individuals and f
i
t is a set of factors specic to individual i. It can
be shown that this model can be reduced to models previously considered in the literature. For instance, if
ft =  (t; t m) for m  1, the model reduces to a version of the implicit contracts model of Beaudry and
DiNardo (1995). If ft = t, the model can be reduced to a standard Walrasian model where  i (t) = wi (t).
In general, the intratemporal condition (A.3) may correspond to a class of implicit contracts models or a
class of Walrasian models. Since each class of models implies a particular relationship between wages and
the business cycle, the relationship between ft and wt can be used to draw inferences about the validity of
each of these theories.
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where
yi;t = yi;t, i;t =

i;t i;t 1    i;t pi+1
0
, xt =

1 f ct 1    f
c
t qi
f st 1    f
sk
t qi
0
wi;t = bc;i u
f
c;t + bs;iu
f
s;t, vi;t =

ui;t 01x(pi 1)
0
, A0i = Bi, Bi =

bc;i bs;i

H0 =

1 01x(pi 1)

,  =
2
64 c;1    c;qi 0    0
0    0 s;1    s;qi
3
75 , Fi=
2
64 i;1    i;pi 1 i;pi
I(pi 1)x(pi 1) 0(pi 1)x1
3
75
The variance matrix of vi;t is
E
 
vi;tv
0
i;

= Qi=
8>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>:
2
66666664
2i 0    0
0      
...
...      
...
0       0
3
77777775
for t = 
0pi x pi otherwise
Consequently, the system B.1 - B.2 satises the following conditions:
1. E
 
w2i;t

= b2c;i
2
f;c + b
2
s;i
2
f;s = Ri
2. E (wi;twi; ) = 0, and E (vi;twi; ) = 0 for all t and 
Equations B.1 and B.2 are the observation and state equations, respectively. The recur-
sion of the Kalman lter begins with bi;0j0 which denotes the unconditional mean of i;1, wherebi;0j0 = E  i;1 = 0, The asssociated Mean Square Error (MSE) is Pi;0j0 =  = E  i;10i;1
where  = FF0 +Q. To enable the recursion steps we replace missing observations with
values drawn from the distribution of the data,25
25Alternatively, instead of drawing a value from L (), we can merely skip the updating equations by
assuming that bi; j = bi; j 1 and Pi; j 1 = Pi; j 1. The results do not change signicantly under this
alternative.
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L
 
yi;t=;i;t; :::; i;t p

=
 
22i
 1=2
exp

 
1
22i
 
yi;t   byi;t=t 12

where byi;t=t 1 = yi;t i;t+i;1i;t 1+:::+i;pi;t p. The transition from bi;t 1jt 1 and Pi;t 1jt 1
to bi;tjt and Pi;tjt is given by the following set of equations26
bi;tjt 1 = Fibi;t 1jt 1
Pi;tjt 1 = FiPi;t 1jt 1F
0
i +Qi
bytjt 1 = A0ixt +H0bi;tjt 1
bi;tjt = bi;tjt 1 +Pi;tjt 1H  H0Pi;tjt 1H+Ri 1  yt   bytjt 1
Pi;tjt = Pi;tjt 1  Pi;tjt 1H
 
H0Pi;tjt 1H+Ri
 1
H0Pi;tjt 1
Since our goal is to form an inference about the value of i;t based on the full set of
time series we compute the smoothed estimate bi;tjT and the corresponding MSE, Pi;tjT , by
conditioning on next periods observation that is, bi;tjT = bi;tjt + Ji bi;t+1jT   bi;t+1jt and
Pi;tjT = Pi;tjt + Jit
 
Pi;t+1jT  Pi;t+1jt

J0it where Jit = Pi;tjtF
0
iP
 1
i;t+1jt.
27 Wherever there is a
missing observation, in each loop of the Markov chain, we replace it with yi;t = 
1
i;t+ bc;if
c
t +
bs;if
s
t where 
1
i;t is the rst element of the drawing 

i;t from N
bi;tjT ;Pi;tjT. The values
for the missing observations are drawn right after the completion of steps 1 and 2 of the
estimation procedure.
26The formulas were directly taken from Hamiltons (1994) time series textbook. For more details con-
cerning the algorithm refer to Hamilton pp. 377-381.
27Refer to Hamilton (1994) pp.394-397.
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Figure 1: Dynamic factors (means, upper and lower bounds), 1980-1993
(a) Common factor
(b) Skilled factor
(c) Unskilled factor
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Figure 2: The Wage (common) factor vs other factors, 1980-1993
(a) TFP (- -) vs Wage Factor ()
(b) Macro factor (- -) vs Wage factor ()
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Figure 3: Factor loading cummulative distributions
(a) Common factor loading distribution
(b) Skilled factor loading distribution
(c) Unskilled factor loading distribution
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Figure 4: Histograms (frequencies) of variance decompositions
(a) Common factor
(b) Skilled factor
(c) Unskilled factor
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution functions of the variance decompositions
(a) Common factor
(b) Skilled factor
(c) Unskilled factor
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Table 1: Composition of the Sample
category # of people % in sample % of missing obs.
skilled males minority 40 1.90 0.86
skilled males nonminority 89 4.19 1.80
skilled females minority 60 2.82 1.16
skilled females nonminority 98 4.61 1.99
unskilled males minority 528 24.90 6.30
unskilled males nonminority 452 21.30 4.88
unskilled females minority 428 20.14 5.70
unskilled females nonminority 428 20.14 5.08
aggregate 2123 100.0 27.77
males 1109 52.23 13.84
females 1014 47.77 13.93
skilled 287 13.52 5.81
unskilled 1836 86.48 21.96
minority 1056 49.74 14.02
nonminority 1067 50.26 13.75
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Table 2: Variance Decompositions*
common factor skill factor idiosyncratic factor
decomp. # of workers % in sample # of workers % in sample # of workers % in sample
(%) sk un tot sk un tot sk un tot sk un tot sk un tot sk un tot
0-10 194 1262 1456 67.60 68.74 68.58 190 1285 1475 66.20 69.99 69.48 0 5 5 0 0.27 0.24
10-20 48 394 442 16.72 21.46 20.82 30 282 312 10.45 15.36 14.70 6 8 14 2.09 0.44 0.66
20-30 24 92 116 8.36 5.01 5.46 25 115 140 8.71 6.26 6.59 10 31 41 3.48 1.69 1.93
30-40 9 46 55 3.14 2.51 2.59 11 58 69 3.83 3.16 3.25 6 43 49 2.09 2.34 2.31
40-50 10 23 33 3.48 1.25 1.55 12 41 53 4.18 2.23 2.50 19 55 74 6.62 3 3.49
50-60 2 13 15 0.70 0.71 0.71 8 30 38 2.79 1.63 1.79 26 80 106 9.06 4.36 4.99
60-70 0 4 4 0 0.22 0.19 7 17 24 2.44 0.93 1.13 21 145 166 7.32 7.90 7.82
70-80 0 1 1 0 0.05 0.05 4 5 9 1.39 0.27 0.42 30 256 286 10.45 13.94 13.47
80-90 0 1 1 0 0.05 0.05 0 3 3 0 0.16 0.14 44 518 562 15.33 28.21 26.47
90-100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 125 695 820 43.55 37.85 38.62
*sk = skilled, un = unskilled, tot = total
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